A “Most Disastrous” Affair

The Battle of Hungry Hill, Historical Memory, and the Rogue River War

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“Do you know the story of the Battle of Hungry Hill? A woman—Queen Mary — led the Native Americans from horseback, and her booming voice could be heard across the battlefield. They won that battle” — Coquille elder George Bundy Wasson Jr., 1994

IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1855, news reached the Willamette Valley of a defeat suffered by a force of Oregon territorial volunteers and two companies of the U.S. Army’s First Regiment of U.S. Dragoons at the hands of the Takelma in the remote mountains of southern Oregon. A correspondent for the Oregon Statesman newspaper reported:

The war in the South has become a real and earnest affair. The battle in the Grave Creek hills has proved most disastrous to our side. It is supposed that there were not more than 100 fighting Indians engaged in the action. On our side were over 300 volunteers and more than 100 regulars. The loss on the side of the Indians was very trifling, probably not more than 7 or 8 killed. The Indians had taken a position in the mountains, about 15 miles west of the road to Jacksonville — an almost inaccessible place. After two days of [the] hardest kind of fighting the Indians were left in possession of the field. In about ten days it is proposed to renew the attack. The exterminators are rather down in the mouth. Maj. Ross was present in command of the southern battalion. God only knows when or where this war may end.

The Battle of Grave Creek Hills of October 31 and November 1, 1855, also remembered as the Battle of Hungry Hill, was a humiliating defeat for a fragile coalition of U.S. Army dragoons and several companies of citizen volunteers (the “exterminators” led by southern Oregon volunteer officer John E. Ross referenced in the above quote). What was planned as a coor-

THIS VIEW FROM the Grave Creek Hills toward the Rogue River is near the Hungry Hill battle site. The true story of the battle and the location itself were soon lost after the Takelma defeated U.S. Army’s First Regiment of U.S. Dragoons in the fall of 1855. In September 2012, a team of archaeologists and scholars discovered the battle site, and their research points to a history of the battle that is sometimes at odds with long-standing portrayals of the Battle of Hungry Hill.
dinated and concerted strike against an outnumbered and technologically inferior opponent ended as a rout: the American forces suffered some fourteen dead and twenty-seven wounded and left the Takelma, in the words of Lt. George Crook of the U.S. Army, as “monarchs of the woods.” The battle helped mark the opening of the Rogue River War of 1855–1856. The U.S. Army and citizen volunteers intended that it would quickly end a rebellion by leaders of the Takelma, Shasta, and Athapaskan people against Euro-American colonialism. Instead, the war would continue over the winter, until the confederated Native American forces were finally defeated on the lower Rogue River the following May.

Despite ranking as one of the larger battles between the U.S. Army and Native Americans in the American West, and certainly among the worst defeats suffered by the U.S. Army at the hands of an Indigenous military force, the story of the Battle of Hungry Hill was soon distorted and the very location of the battlefield itself was lost. In September 2012, archaeologist John Craig, working as part of a team of academic, military, Tribal, and community-based scholars, found artifacts from the battle, marking the rediscovery of the Hungry Hill battlefield after 157 years. Subsequent archaeological, cartographic, and historical research identified and interpreted four separate areas where parts of the battle took place, and recovered over 100 musket balls, belt buckles, and other artifacts that helped piece together, in forensic detail, the course of the battle as it played out over two days. This anthropological research painted a detailed picture, one that was sometimes at odds with

long-standing portrayals of the Battle of Hungry Hill and the Rogue River War in general. Like other historical events on the leading edge of the American frontier, by the late nineteenth century, pioneer memorialists had mythologized the story of the Battle of Hungry Hill into a larger origin tale for the State of Oregon. The nature and scale of the defeat were minimized to fit more easily into a narrative of a triumphant pioneer settlement free from moral questions about the fate of Oregon’s Indigenous people or the humiliation of a defeat at the hands of a well-coordinated Native American military force under the command of a woman.

**THE COLONIZATION OF SOUTHERN OREGON AND THE ROGUE RIVER WAR**

The roots of the Rogue River War of 1855–1856 can be traced to the 1820s, when Northwest Company and Hudson’s Bay Company expeditions first ventured into southern Oregon in the service of British imperialist interests and the global fur trade. Over the following years, Euro-Americans interacted with Native American people living in the rugged and mountainous regions of the southern Oregon coast and the interior Umpqua River and Rogue River valleys, but permanent European settlements were rare, even after the first American expeditions began to use the Oregon-California Trail in the 1830s. For two decades, travel continued to be through, rather than to, the region, along a route that generally followed today’s Interstate 5, linking the lower Columbia River and Willamette Valley settlements with California. Euro-American settlement increased dramatically with the Gold Rush, and by 1853, thousands of immigrants had flooded the region, establishing Ashland Mills, Jacksonville, Port Orford, Winchester, and other smaller communities and mining operations. Throughout these decades, conflict and negotiation between the region’s Indigenous people and the new settlers was ongoing, punctuated by episodes both of extreme violence and of attempts at peacemaking led by diplomats on either side.

A treaty signed with the United States government in September 1853 created the short-lived Table Rock Indian Reservation. This experiment was, however, never really successful, as neither all the region’s American settlers nor its Indigenous people acknowledged the wisdom or authority of the Table Rock Treaty. Both sides continually violated agreements, and episodes of trespass, robbery, and murder, again perpetrated by both sides, were ongoing. On October 8, 1855, open warfare erupted in southern Oregon after a group of American vigilantes from Jacksonville murdered the inhabitants of Native American settlements at the mouth of Little Butte Creek, an
event since known as the Lupton Massacre. In the aftermath, many Native Americans abandoned the reservation, ensoncing themselves in inaccessible areas to conduct a guerrilla campaign against the settlers. During the following weeks, they burned pioneer homesteads, destroyed supply trains, and murdered settlers.10

It took three weeks to organize a concerted response. On the night of October 30, Cap. Andrew Jackson Smith, with two companies of the First Regiment of United States Dragoons; John E. Ross, commanding five companies of Ninth Regiment of Oregon Mounted Volunteers from Jackson County; and two companies of volunteers from the Governor’s Northern Battalion of Oregon Mounted Volunteers gathered at Grave Creek and Wolf Creek on the Oregon-California Trail.11 Based on intelligence gathered by pioneer scouts, Smith planned a night march into the Grave Creek Hills to surround and attack by surprise an encampment of Taklema that included fighting personnel as well as families, children, and stock animals then located on the Cow Creek–Grave Creek divide some six miles to the west. By eleven o’clock on the evening of October 30, Smith had finalized his plans. The American forces departed their bivouacs in two separate columns, descending Grave Creek and Wolf Creek by moonlight. Due to miscommunication and misguidance in the darkness, by daybreak the next day the forces had missed their agreed-on flanking assignments and instead found themselves knotted up together, facing their opponent across a two-mile-wide, 1,500-foot-deep canyon. Imprudently, several volunteers lit a fire to keep warm, thus giving up their position and losing any remaining element of surprise.12

As the sun rose, Smith and Ross lost control of their men, who, eager for battle on seeing the Takelma on the opposite ridgeline, threw their gear aside and charged headlong down the interceding valley. Hours later, after climbing the steep slopes of the far side of the canyon, they found themselves directly in front of the carefully defended position. Undeterred, they charged the hilltop. Anticipating this action, the defenders displaced off the crest of the hill and released a fusillade of musket fire into the van of the attacking force.13 Several were wounded and one man was killed — John Gillespie, the son of a noted pioneer family of Lane County.14 The failure of this initial assault and Gillespie’s death had a stultifying effect on the fatigued Americans; Lt. August V. Kautz, U.S. Army, later wrote that “this one dead man won the battle, two thirds of the men never got past this one dead body.”15 The Native American forces, now safely ensconced within a breastworks of storm-thrown logs and stumps in a saddle that blocked the narrow ridgeline west of the hilltop, resisted several attempts to flank their position, and the American forces remained pinned down throughout the afternoon. One Native American sniper, hidden within the stump of a hollow tree, caused several casualties, and Smith and Ross were forced to establish a base to care for the wounded on the hilltop to the east.16 By the end of the day, with most of the citizen volunteers having deserted the field, Smith organized a charge headlong down the ridgeline directly into the Native American defenses.17 Executed “with but few men” this last-ditch attempt also failed, but the fired .69-caliber musket balls found in the ridgeline saddle during the archaeological survey attest that Smith’s men got within about fifty yards of the defended position before falling back with several casualties.18

The Battle of Hungry Hill earned its name because Smith and Ross’s men had little food with them, and they still faced a second night in the field. As darkness fell, the Americans retreated to a small spring located in a nearby gully. “Bloody Springs,” as it came to be known, was identified archaeologically by the presence of unfired lead shot, a percussion cap, buckles, and

This map shows southern Oregon in 1850. The Takelma who fought in the Battle of Hungry Hill had abandoned Table Rock Reservation following the Lupton Massacre of October 8, 1855, where vigilantes from the gold mining town of Jacksonville attacked several Native American communities on the banks of the Rogue River, massacring its inhabitants. The U.S. Army Dragoons stationed at Fort Lane and the local citizen volunteers attacked the Takelma encampment in the Grave Creek Hills from temporary bivouacs on the Oregon-California Trail at the Wolf Creek and Grave Creek crossings.
other equipment left behind from the improvised American encampment. One participant, Edward Sheffield, described how that “night would long be remembered by those who were there. The night was cold, and what few blankets we had with us were used by the wounded, the rest having to keep themselves warm the best way they could.” The men huddled around fires, posted guards, and settled in for the night. Around midnight, “an accidental shot from a pistol caused a stampede in camp, which is more easily imagined than described. The clash of arms, the cry of Indians in camp, and the general confusion, baffles description.” Several Americans were wounded by friendly fire in the ensuing panic, and at least one man died as a result.

Daybreak of November 1, 1855, found the American forces surrounded in their Bloody Springs bivouac, a tactic the Native American force employed to provide cover for the retreat of their non-combatants westward toward the Rogue River canyon. The Native Americans taunted the Americans, “inviting them to choro [come out], calling them damned Boston [American] sons of bitches.” Gunfire was exchanged, and more men were wounded, including Lt. Horatio Gates Gibson of the U.S. Army. By early afternoon, the Takelma had retreated westward following their families, and the fighting halted. Smith, Ross, and their men began to remove eastward to the Oregon-California Trail, the wounded carried by hand on litters or, in some cases, slung over the backs of horses, where “many could not restrain the outcries provoked by their sufferings.” Army, local settlers, and newly arrived volunteers set up field hospitals at both Grave Creek and Wolf Creek. James H. “Jimmy” Twogood, an early settler of the Grave Creek area, described the arriving survivors as “the most woebegone, bedraggled, crestfallen set of men that I ever beheld.” After three days, the Battle of Hungry Hill had ended in a rout and the Takelma—who demonstrated superior tactics, coordination, and resolve against a force perhaps twice their size—remained intact to fight throughout the winter.

A BATTLEFIELD REMEMBERED

At the outset of our research, there seemed a dearth of readily available information about the Hungry Hill fight, particularly given the scale and consequence of the battle, and nobody seemed to know exactly where it had taken place. Most historians of recent decades mention the battle but underestimate the scale of the defeat and the consequence it had in fracturing the alliance between the U.S. Army and the citizen volunteers, and fail to credit the Native American forces for their superior tactics, resolve, and coordination. Elaborate memoirs, written by then-elderly pioneer veterans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, painted a picture of the battle that was also at odds with the few contemporary documents on hand. The mythologization of the Battle of Hungry Hill was expressed in memoirs that accentuated, celebrated, and exaggerated the individual heroism of the participants; denigrated Indigenous people as less than human or revealed in the equally dehumanizing stereotype of the Noble Savage; minimized both the scale of the defeat suffered by the Euro-Americans and the severity of the internecine conflict between Euro-American factions; neglected to recognize significant points described in credible sources (such as that a good portion of the volunteer forces deserted the battlefield); failed to credit their Takelma opponents for greater organization, coordination, and resolve; or blamed the Euro-American failure simply on being outnumbered, on the inefficiency of their weapons, or on their lack of supplies. These narratives, tacitly or overtly, mythologized the Battle of Hungry Hill, the Rogue River War, and the colonial enterprise in southern Oregon generally as a heroic, patriotic, victorious, and thematically unproblematic narrative.

The anonymous writer of an 1856 article, for example, acknowledged the severity of the event but claimed that the battle ended “without either party being the victors” and that the Euro-Americans retreated simply for want of supplies. A year later, another writer likewise reported that the “Indians fought most desperately . . . and from the nature of their position it was impossible to dislodge them” but that “the loss was about equal on both side.” With the passage of time, the hyperbole increased: an anonymous memorialist acknowledged the “skill and bravery” of the Native American combatants and that the battle “was certainly the severest fight that ever took place between the Indians and white men on this side of the Rocky Mountain” but described how the assault on Bloody Springs by the “howling savages” was repulsed by the “coolest whites,” and while the Native Americans had eluded them, the retreat from the field was driven primarily by a lack of supplies. Southern Oregon settler and volunteer veteran J. Marion Gale went so far to suggest that “Leonidas and Thermopylaeae never exemplified greater human bravery” than the pioneers of southern Oregon under assault from the Native Americans, and that Cap. Smith and the dragoons from Fort Lane would simply have “been annihilated” without the help of the citizen volunteers. According to Gale, after the Euro-Americans returned fire from Bloody Springs on the morning of November 1, the “Indians broke and ran in wild dismay” with the loss of some forty dead and that “certain it is” that the Battle of Hungry Hill was a “turning point of the war” that ultimately led to the Native American defeat. Other examples include William M. Colvig, who described the battle as being “very
indecisive”; J.B. Horner, who described how the Native American forces made a “desperate attack, but were forced to retire to the brush”; battle veteran Sam Hansaker, who remembered the battle as where his “brave comrades had lain down their lives in defense of their frontier home”; and an anonymous writer who described the battle in terms of the rescue of one wounded man, the “most daring act of bravery I ever saw.”

There were exceptions. William H. Byars described how after the battle started, “the panic for retreat among many was as contagious as had been the enthusiasm for the charge”; and Walter S. Kitchen, who in 1901 ascribed the debacle in the Grave Creek Hills directly to the inexperience and poor leadership of the U.S. Army and volunteer officers and placed the blame for the war squarely on the perpetrators of the Lupton Massacre, whom he described as “outlaws” who “had acted in a way that would have disgraced Indians.”

A memoir by H.G. Guild, published in the *Sunday Oregonian* on April 20, 1898, further illustrates the point. It presents a highly detailed discussion of the role Lt. Phil Sheridan played in the battle, complete with re-created dialogue:

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Shortly after the troops retreated to the hill, Sheridan sought Smith and Judah, and in tones that betrayed his disgust and anger, said: “Captain Smith, what in ---- was the matter with you and Judah? By ----, sir, your carelessness in firing upon Drew and myself is inexcusable!”

Smith replied that, owing to the dense underbrush between himself and Drew and Sheridan, he had no definite idea of their whereabouts at the time; but, further than this statement he made no explanation, and though both Smith and Judah ranked him, Sheridan continued to speak his mind about the blunder freely, until Smith reminded him that his language was insubordinate, and would be taken into account. Sheridan replied that he, too, would have something to say at a court-martial, if Smith declared one.

Judah then interrupted, by saying: “Lieutenant Sheridan, Captain Smith is your superior officer. This is no time nor place to discuss the matter. It can be settled at headquarters.”

Sheridan, still swearing, went back to his command. To Drew he said: “That was bad business, colonel, and it seems inexcusable to me.”
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In this passage, Sheridan represents the voice of the intrepid and practical frontiersman speaking his mind against his more academic and staid commanding officer, the Philadelphia born-and-bred Smith. Sheridan would certainly have resonated in this role by the time this memoir was written in 1890. By then, he was a nationally famous war hero, the illustrious General Sheridan who had helped defeat Robert E. Lee at Appomattox and the Plains Indians during the Plains War. A Cold War amphibious armored vehicle is named after him, and the phrase “The Only Good Indian is a dead Indian” is attributed to him. Whether Sheridan actually said this or not is irrelevant; that he was, in that era, so associated in the public mind with nationalism and the genocide of Indigenous people that this quote resonated so easily is the relevant point that gives potency to his fictional use in the Hungry Hill narrative. Sheridan, in this role, served to connect (and make relevant) Oregon and its origin story to nationalistic narratives then being developed.

In the 1850s, young Phil Sheridan had in fact been part of the U.S. Army in the West. His association with the Native Americans of western Oregon began on April 19, 1856, when, as the Rogue River War was concluding, he was ordered by Gen. John E. Wool to the Coast Reservation from Fort Vancouver. That Smith was at the Battle of Hungry Hill is certain; however, neither “Judah” (i.e. Cap. Henry Judah, another U.S. Army officer then in command of Fort Jones in northern California), “Drew” (Charles S. Drew, adjutant of the southern Oregon volunteers), nor Sheridan were participants in the Battle of Hungry Hill in the fall of 1855.
Beyond the obvious exaggerations, self-aggrandizement, and myth-making in such accounts, a more subtle bias is how they generally smooth over internal political and cultural conflicts within the American ranks, the degree of violence perpetrated by all sides, and the ambiguities over the causes and effects of the war and of mid-nineteenth-century Indian affairs of the Oregon territory generally. This kind of storytelling is perhaps best illustrated by the anonymous author of a memoir appearing in the Sunday Oregonian on April 20, 1884:

When the news of the butchery . . . reached the mines and farms, the entire male population of the Rogue River Valley sprang to arms with a unanimity and promptness in consonance with the extreme gravity of the situation. . . . The command of the military had devolved, by right of his commission as colonel of the Ninth Regiment of Oregon militia, upon John E. Ross, an Indian fighter of great experience, judgment and resolution. The company commanders numbered several men who had already achieved celebrity by their conflicts with the red men; for here were individuals who had fought the Comanches, Pawnees, Sioux and had tasted the hardships of war in Mexico and Texas. Conspicuous among them was Bob Williams, the renowned plainsman, well known throughout the mines. James Bruce was there, characteristically impatient to fall upon the foe. Jacob Rinearson had left his claim on Cow Creek at the first news of the massacre, and assembling, perhaps, two score of his neighbors, had arrived upon the bloody ground almost before the corpses of the slain men, women and children had stiffened in death; and having performed guard duty until the beginning of the active campaign, he was now ready with his men to take part therein. Bailey, at the head of the Lane County contingent, had made forced marches from Eugene City, burning to avenge the murder of his brother, killed not far from the celebrated Canyon. Welton, Griffin, T. Smiley Harris, Wilkinson and other men of might and courage were there, whose names yet linger in the recollections of the people of southern Oregon and are not likely to be forgotten as long as bravery and hardihood possess a charm. . . . The total force of volunteers was about 300 men, who were all young, vigorous, enthusiastic and daring, and formed the very best material for a war of the sort proposed. Their average age could not have been above 25, and their character is well expressed by a present survivor, who says, "A coward had no show among us."

Dispensing with nuance, even-handedness, and accuracy, this author underscores the righteousness of the settler cause as simply vengeance for Native American “butchery,” emphasizes the unity of settler action, and points to the bravery and youthful vigor of the participants. In contrast, primary documents of the 1850s reveal ongoing tensions between the volunteers, who generally favored nativist politics and the removal or even outright genocide of Oregon’s Indigenous people, and the officers of the Federal Indian Superintendency and the United States Army, who by and large favored negotiation and paternalistic (if less deadly) solutions. This conflict was seemingly forgotten or left out of the memoirs produced in that optimistic era of Gilded Age and Progressive Era mythologizing that favored instead an unproblematic and conciliatory narrative that turned disagreement into unity of action and defeat into victory. In such a moment of literary myth-making, even the Native American leaders could be graciously honored. The same 1884 anonymous account went on to explain:

Their principal leader was John, chief of the small but hardy and daring band of Applegate Indians. Probably no Indian of this country — or, for that matter, of any time — has ever evinced in greater degree the possession of commanding talents. Old John was the central figure of the war, and stands forth as an individual of intermitting courage and resolution, of ample strategic skill and extensive resources. He has been epigrammatically termed the Tecumseh of the war — a title that his characteristics rendered appropriate, and his final misfortunes still more closely befitted. Nor were the other chiefs despicable in comparison; Old Limpy, the lame chieftain of the Illinois band, had achieved a foremost name as a cutthroat of renown, and from his habits of cruelty and malignity was perhaps the most dreaded of all the savages. The lesser tyees were active in emulating their bold leaders, and the unknown and undistinguished braves — Indians of the various branches of the great Rogue River tribe and neighboring allies — were worthy of such leaders. At the end of October 1855, Tyee John was in the mountains above Deer Creek in the Illinois River valley, waging a guerrilla campaign against travelers on the Crescent City Trail. Like Sheridan, Tyee John was not actually involved in the Battle of Hungry Hill. Heroic and famous, but ultimately defeated and pacified, Indigenous leaders are a common literary trope in colonial mythology, and Tyee John, on a local level, indeed fit the mold of Sitting Bull and Tecumseh in the larger national narrative to safely elevate the bravery and youthful vigor of the participants. In contrast, primary documents of the 1850s reveal ongoing tensions between the volunteers, who generally favored nativist politics and the removal or even outright genocide of Oregon’s Indigenous people, and the officers of the Federal Indian Superintendency and the United States Army, who by and large favored negotiation and paternalistic (if less deadly) solutions. This conflict was seemingly forgotten or left out of the memoirs produced in that optimistic era of Gilded Age and Progressive Era mythologizing that favored instead an unproblematic and conciliatory narrative that turned disagreement into unity of action and defeat into victory. In such a moment of literary myth-making, even the Native American leaders could be graciously honored. The same 1884 anonymous account went on to explain:

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social experience of the 1850s, and beyond any lingering questions of victory or defeat, cowardice, or bravery.

A BATTLEFIELD LOST

While many of the late-nineteenth-century settlers were memorializing their heroism in the Battle of Hungry Hill in print, the battlefield itself was already lost. The 1884 anonymous memoir lamented that the “field whereon the Battle of Hungry Hill was fought is now unknown except to the few survivors of the campaign. . . . Underbrush covers the ground where so much blood was spilt, and the graves of the five volunteers who were buried near Bloody Springs have long since lost their identity and merged into a single mound.”46 That same decade, the first General Land Office surveyors who crossed the Grave Creek Hills mapping section lines were seemingly completely unaware — as witnessed in their field notes still on file with the Bureau of Land Management — that they were crossing and re-crossing a battlefield of some historical importance. By 1935, southern Oregon forest ranger R.I. Helm reported from his home in Sunny Valley that the:

memorable field of strife is now almost unknown, save to the few present survivors of the volunteers who occasionally visit it. Rank underbrush and grasses have usurped the place where blood was shed. . . . I began inquiring of those of my neighbors who had lived there for many years, regarding the location of Hungry Hill. No one seemed to know.47

By the post–World War II period, Hungry Hill appeared as the place-name of a hilltop in the Grave Creek Hills on maps produced by the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Geological Survey, but the specific location of the battle remained unknown.

The battlefield was also lost to the canon of U.S. history in the American West. There are many possible reasons for this, including a relative scarcity of reliable primary accounts of the battle dating to the immediate aftermath. This absence is not necessarily a product of the record-keeping habits of the time, as after-action reports were routinely written by Army officers during this era and can be found in the records of the U.S. Army in the National Archives and Records Administration. While other engagements of the Rogue River War are well detailed through such reports, no official account written by any of the principal U.S. Army officers present at the battle has been found.48 If an after-action report was written by the overall commander of the battle, Smith of the First Regiment of U.S. Dragoons, U.S. Army, it has not been found despite the efforts of a number of scholars over many years.49 Likewise, contemporary writings by the members of the volunteers are few and far between, and primary Native American accounts, with one exception (discussed below), are non-existent. Instead, our documentary view of the Battle of Hungry Hill is through a lens of time, a political and cultural dispute, and a considerable degree of hyperbole. Given the magnitude of the defeat and the political acrimony surrounding the battle, there is the real possibility that many of the participants would have preferred that the Battle of Hungry Hill be forgotten.

Despite that relative silence, a handful of accounts of the battle are extant from the viewpoint of U.S. Army officers. In 1859, Cap. Thomas J. Cram, who was not present, wrote a second-hand narrative of the battle, but it betrays a political slant intended to exonerate the regular army from blame for the defeat at the expense of the citizen volunteers, overtly accusing them of cowardice during the battle.50 Volunteer commander Ross summarized his recollection of the battle in an 1857 letter that, in contradiction to Cram,
emphasizes a high degree of cooperation and harmony among himself, his fellow volunteer officers, and the officers of the U.S. Army, leaving aside all blame and acrimony.51 Ross wrote his letter at the request of volunteer adjutant C.S. Drew, and it is found in the papers of Benjamin Franklin Dowell, in the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley. In the aftermath of the Rogue River War, Drew and Dowell were principals in the volunteers’ quest for compensation from the coffers of the federal government for their service in the Indian wars.52 Such efforts (which were moderately successful in the long run) required demonstrating to federal authorities the legitimacy of their service in the war, which could have led them to over-emphasize the level of cooperation between the volunteers and U.S. Army personnel.53 Nonetheless, Ross’s letter contains information about the battle that can be correlated with other accounts. Dowell’s papers, for example, include a detailed, hand-drawn map of the field of battle, apparently the same map used — according to Ross’s letter — by Smith while they were at the Grave Creek House on the evening of October 30, 1855, to plan their attack on the Indian encampment.

The most complete source of contemporary information about the Battle of Hungry Hill comes from the writings of Second Lt. August V. Kautz.54 Born in Germany, Kautz, like several other junior U.S. Army officers of the Rogue River War, would later distinguish himself in the U.S. Civil War. Kautz also served on a board of inquiry investigating the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. By the time he retired, Kautz had attained the rank of Brigadier General.55 In 1855, however, Kautz was a junior lieutenant stationed at Fort Orford on the Oregon Coast. That October, as the Rogue River War was breaking out, he was scouting eastward through the Klamath Mountains with ten soldiers and a guide, blazing a route to the interior Rogue River valley from the coast along the north side of the Rogue River, when he encountered the encampment of Takelma in the Grave Creek Hills.56 This was the intelligence Smith needed to prosecute the Battle of Hungry Hill. Kautz left at least two and probably three accounts relating directly to the Battle of Hungry Hill. The first is his official journal of his scouting expedition, which contains detailed information about the landscape and the events leading up to the battle as well as hand-drawn maps of the terrain around the Grave Creek Hills that proved useful in the Southern Oregon University Laboratory of Anthropology’s (SOULA) efforts to locate the battlefield.

An account of the battle that appeared in the New York Herald on January 31, 1856, with a dateline of November 12, 1855, from Crescent City, California, possibly presents material written either directly or indirectly by Kautz.57 We know that Kautz passed through Crescent City in mid November, following the battle, and on November 17, Gen. John Wool, the overall commander of the U.S. Army on the West Coast, reported that while en route to Oregon from his headquarters in Benicia, California, he had received a “report from Lt. Kautz [about the Hungry Hill battle] at Crescent City.”58 This report, according to Wool, “confirm[ed] the details of Captain Smith’s engagements,” but it is not clear how he received those details, whether from an actual written report (now lost or deliberately misplaced) or just verbally.59 The language in the New York Herald article bears the stamp of a professional officer with an intimate knowledge of the battle and uses military jargon, including the use of formal rank and unit designations, for the participants. Much of the language and perspective in the New York Herald article is similar to the writing in a letter that Kautz composed under his own name and mailed to former Oregon Territorial Governor Joseph Lane on December 1, 1855. Kautz wrote this letter shortly after his return to Port Orford after travelling home, in the aftermath of the battle, via Fort Lane and thence to Crescent City, where he met with Wool. Kautz’s letter to Lane, apparently written in confidence, remains the most thorough contemporary account of the Battle of Hungry Hill.60 It repeats, often with the same words as the New York Herald article, the details of the battle’s planning and execution, but unlike the newspaper article, Kautz’s letter includes candid editorializing that casts both his fellow U.S. Army officers as well as the volunteer officers and volunteers in a frank and often unflattering light.

How Kautz’s narrative of the Battle of Hungry Hill ended up in the hands of the New York Herald from Crescent City remains a mystery, much like the fate of Smith’s after-action report, which was either never written or was lost.61 There is precedence for military officers leaking information and opinions to the press in that era; Kautz’s contemporary, Cap. Edward O.C. Ord, Third Artillery, for example, wrote unflatteringly about army life during the Rogue River War in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine under the name “Sergeant Jones.”62 Based on his letter to Lane, Kautz was clearly unimpressed by the actions of his comrades. He questioned the professionalism, leadership, and competence of his fellow army officers, suggesting — with considerable justification — that Smith had bungled the battle by underestimating the enemy, not keeping control of his men, and failing to bring the dragoons’ mountain howitzer to the battle. He was even more contemptuous of the citizen volunteers, suggesting that seventy or more had deserted the battle after the first shots were fired and that the local volunteers were accustomed to being paid for fighting Indians, which may have served as a motivating factor both in starting the war and their subsequent participation.
Given the debacle, it is perhaps less than surprising that, with the exception of the New York Herald article, newspaper accounts from the aftermath of the battle generally fail to provide an excess of useful dispassionate detail. Some of the earliest initial reports are brief and provide accurate information about the battle, but others are wildly speculative. An account in the Oregon Statesman on November 10, 1855, reported that Smith’s plan “was to plant his howitzers upon an eminence three-fourths of a mile distant . . . from which he could throw shell and grape among them.” It is clear from Kautz’s accounts as well as other writings, however, that the dragoons left their twelve-pounder mountain howitzer back home at Fort Lane. This was one of the very decisions that Kautz was most critical about in his assessment of the battle. Nonetheless, several later commentators, including historian Frances Fuller Victor, used this Oregon Statesman account to describe, inaccurately, the course of the battle.

A BATTLEFIELD FOUND

SOULA’s research into the Hungry Hill battlefield is part of a renewed interest in the colonial era of Oregon by anthropologists and historians that is, in part, a response to the now common participation of scholars from Oregon’s Indian nations in researching and presenting our collective colonial past. Recent works by Theodore Stern, Don Whereat, Gray Whaley, Charles Wilkinson, David Lewis, George Wasson, Jason Younker, David R.M. Beck, and others have recast the discussion of Oregon’s territorial period to include Indigenous perspectives. Through these efforts, the cant, authority, and ideology of presentations of the past are themselves open to critique, and have opened the door to a praxis of experiencing history that is open-sourced, collaborative, critical, and evolving. Previously hoarded or difficult-to-access primary documents are now more readily available in digital and Tribal archives, and archaeologists are more commonly opening their projects and interpretations to public participation and dialog. The discovery and analysis of the history and site of the Battle of Hungry Hill, including an explication of the mythologizing and re-mythologizing of the battle over time, is a tangible result of this new collaborative praxis.

The Hungry Hill project emerged from earlier research by SOULA, the Southern Oregon Historical Society, and the Oregon Parks and Recreation Department at Fort Lane, a National Register of Historic Places property in Jackson County that was used by the U.S. Army during the Rogue River War. The dragoons who fought in the Battle of Hungry Hill were stationed at Fort Lane, and in 2009, SOULA began working with archaeologists from the Medford District of the Bureau of Land Management, Lisa Rice and Merry Haydon, to survey the Grave Creek Hills in an attempt to locate the battlefield. Rice facilitated a meeting with Larry McLane, a pioneer descendant and lifelong resident of Sunny Valley, a small community on Grave Creek from where, in 1855, the dragoons and citizen volunteers set forth to fight the Battle of Hungry Hill. McLane had long collected local oral histories and primary documents, and he published a book on the history of northern Josephine County in 1995. The Battle of Hungry Hill figures heavily in this book, and in conversation with this author, McLane noted, as the project...
researchers came to discover, that there was a dearth of contemporary primary documents written by the battle’s participants. In our discussions, McLane suggested, prophetically, that a key to finding and understanding the battle would be discovering some kind of memoir by Kautz.

The project came to include retired Jackson County Surveyor Roger Roberts and John Craig, who had worked with Douglas Scott and his colleagues on the archaeological survey of the Battle of Little Bighorn site in Montana, a project that revolutionized archaeological approaches to battlefield archaeology and ultimately served as a model for our work at the Hungry Hill Battlefield. Col. Daniel Edgerton, retired from the U.S. Army Center of Military History, also joined the project and shared a comprehensive set of military documents from the National Archives relating to the Rogue River Wars and the Battle of Hungry Hill. Like McLane, Edgerton noted that after-action reports about the battle by Smith and his fellow officers were notably missing from the archival record. Also participating were Stafford Hazelett, a researcher of Oregon’s emigrant trails, and Ben Truwe of the Southern Oregon Historical Society, an archivist behind the self-funded Southern Oregon History, Revised online archive that provides thousands of pages of primary documents, accurately transcribed and provenienced, to the public.

This author’s interest in the battle came, originally, from discussions with Coquille elder George B. Wasson, Jr. Years ago, Wasson correctly pointed out that a key facet of the battle — the role of a Takelma woman named Queen Mary — had been underappreciated. The project also benefitted greatly from the participation of several Native American scholars, including historian Robert Kentta of the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, whose family maintained oral histories about the battle; Jordan Mercier, John Mercier, and David Harrelson of the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community; and Jessica Plueard of the Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Indians. Archaeological field work always fosters community among participants, but it was particularly moving to labor together over several weeks with academic, Native American, community, and military scholars on ground where our collective ancestors had fought to bloody death. The communal nature of the work yielded clear dividends: both the New York Herald article and Kautz’s letter to Lane were discovered during the project, by Robert Kentta and Ben Truwe, respectively, and the connection between the two was made as a result of the face-to-face conversations between the project participants while in the field.
FRANCES JOHNSON AND QUEEN MARY

Although Native American scholars were instrumental in the discovery of the Hungry Hill battlefield and the assembly of our archive of primary documents, Native voices directly associated with participants in the battle remain absent, with one exception. An oral history maintained by the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians places Frances Johnson, a Takelma-speaking woman who later served as an informant for many anthropologists, as a participant in the battle as a teenager. According to Kentta, Johnson’s family preserved the account of her involvement, including how she recalled the sound of the musketballs — “Boy, those bullets sounded funny when they fly by your head! Hwwoooo . . . Hwwooo . . . .” — and that “you bet your life that night I danced with a White Man’s scalp on a stick.” Johnson’s story confirms another point underestimated in earlier accounts of the Battle of Hungry Hill: Native American women were active participants in this military victory over the U.S. Army dragoons and citizen volunteers, and one woman appears to have been in a leadership position. Volunteer J. Marion Gale, for example, claimed that one of the Native American “lieutenants was said to be a woman and of no mean fighting qualities,” and a story told by the pioneer Manning family in the South Umpqua River region recalled that, in the Battle of Hungry Hill, the “Indians were commanded by an Indian Princess.”

The most detailed account of a woman in a command position in the battle comes from the unpublished memoir of volunteer officer Cyrenius Mulkey: I could see a good many Indians and got a good view of the Squaw, Sally Lane, who was commanding the battle. She was located upon the mountain side about six or seven hundred yards out of range of our old muzzle loading rifles, and at an elevation of six or eight hundred feet above the battleground, and had the fortification between us and her. The place where she was stationed, on the mountain side, was not very bushy there being quite a space of open ground. The squaw was on horseback, and was giving directions to the Indians. Her position was such that she had a full view of both Indians and Volunteers. I have never seen but one other person who has as powerful [a voice] as had Sally Lane, and that was her father, Chief Joseph Lane, who was the main council Chief of the Rogue River Indians, the same people we were fighting. I could hear her at that distance just as clear and distinct as though we were very near her.

Mulkey, writing in 1910, probably misremembered the specific identity of “Sally Lane.” The woman described was most likely Sally Lane’s sister, Mary, who was the other daughter of Tyee Joe, the “Chief Joseph Lane” in Mulkey’s account. Mary, often described as “Queen Mary” or “Squaw Mary,” appears frequently in written accounts of the 1850s as a dynamic Native American leader with a loud voice, and Mulkey’s account is in this character. Joel Trimble, Company E, First Dragoons, for example, described Mary’s actions during the summer of 1855, when she served as a peacemaker in a standoff between dragoons from Fort Lane and a group of Takelma from the Table Rock Reservation over two escaped prisoners from the Fort Lane guardhouse: Here all was excitement as the fugitives and their emissaries had aroused the whole tribe, who were half-disposed to war movement. They had also formed a band of some twenty of their nearest kin, and this party had donned their war paint, and on our approach had taken to the brush. They were speedily surrounded, but for an admiring audience we had some three hundred or more of the same blood, all armed at our backs, merely waiting for the trouble to begin. However, a parley was struck up. Meanwhile a few more men were got up from our garrison, and the little mountain howitzer charged with grape and canister. Then an influential Squaw, Queen Mary, appeared on the scene, and by her eloquence, assisted by that of some others, a regular battle was arrested.

Mary is also remembered as leading Takelma people in battle in 1853 on Evans Creek, where one witness has her “encouraging the warriors, telling them to take good aim — save their ammunition — and bring down a Boston [an American] every shot.” Mary was “a very influential person” among the Rogue River people, and this influence lay in both the political and, as witnessed by her success in the Battle of Hungry Hill, military realms.

Of all the accounts written about the Hungry Hill battle to date, only O’Donnell accepted at face value what is stated in the primary documents: that the Native Americans at the Battle of Hungry Hill were effectively led, at least in part, by Queen Mary, the daughter of Tyee Joe, and that part of the reason for the obfuscation of the battle over time was a feeling of shame over being defeated by a woman. We identified archaeologically the Hungry Hill battlefield fortification defended by the Native Americans on October 31 on a narrow ridge line saddle between two tall hilltops. Behind and above this location, the western hill would have afforded a panoramic view eastward over the battlefield, including the positions held by the Euro-American assailants on the exposed foresha lop of the eastern hill. From that position, the volunteers and dragoons would have been able to see and hear Queen Mary as Mulkey describes, directing the Native American forces in the fortifications in between.

CONCLUSION

Beginning mere days after the Battle of Hungry Hill, Euro-American accounts overlooked the American defeat, or used it for advantage in the political infighting between their various factions. Decades later, the veterans of the battle minimized the defeat and desertion in their memoirs, sometimes mythologizing the battle to the point of turning it into a victory, complete with famous,
evocative, but imaginary participants such as Tyee John and Philip Sheridan. In the meanwhile, and perhaps partly as a result, the battle was lost to the larger historical narrative of the American West. Given the defeat suffered by the Americans in the Battle of Hungry Hill, the fact that their defeat was at the hands of much smaller, well-coordinated force of Native Americans, and, perhaps not least significantly, that one of the leading architects of their defeat was a Native American woman, both the volunteers and the U.S. Army officers likely would have preferred that the less said about the battle, the better. It is only in their private letters and unpublished memoirs, some unexamined by scholars until recently, that candid reflections on the battle exist.

Kautz, in his private letter to Lane, is perhaps most scathing in summarizing the battle:

There was a want of confidence all around. On the morning of the 1st of Nov., when the Indians attacked us, (which attack was made by about twenty Indians according to my estimate), Cap. Smith was as usual attending to the wounded and Col. Ross did for once show that he was in command by standing down in the gulch and quoting all the gallant speeches that had been made from the Revolution days. Such as “Stand your ground men and don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes and know he is an injun.” Altogether it was an affair that I [would never] boast of and no one shall even know that I was there or had [anything] to do with it, unless he gets it from somebody else. . . . I determined to leave them to fight their own battles and took advantage of my orders “to return to this Post as soon as possible,” to leave them. It is a war they have brought on themselves, the Indians are fighting in self-defense and they fight well. I have every reason to believe that it has been gotten up expressly to procure another appropriation. . . . War is a money making business. When I left they had nearly a thousand troops in the field and I venture to say they will get whipped again notwithstanding the comparatively small number of Indians, unless they fight.”

Kautz’s brutal assessment is corroborated by two additional sources: Walter S. Kitchen, an enlisted man who served in company E, First Dragoons, states plainly in a newspaper memoir published in 1901 that “I guess a good many of us were ashamed of that Hungry Hill defeat,” and volunteer officer Mulkey finished his otherwise bombastic and self-serving unpublished memoir with a rare moment of humility: “I have never seen a detailed account of this battle in print. . . . I think that all of the officers were like myself ashamed to give an account in detail.” In the end, the story of the Battle of Hungry Hill did not fit comfortably into the narrative of a triumphant pioneer settlement of the Oregon Territory.

Scholars such as James Joseph Buss, Ari Kelman, Boyd Cothran, Jean M. O’Brien, and Richard Slotkin have explicitly considered the question of how the violence of the frontier experience was translated — through the storytelling of place — to an emergent American mythology that is morally absolved of the responsibilities of the violence of the colonial encounter. Slotkin wrote that people have “continually felt the need for the sense of coherence and direction in history that myths give to those who believe them.” In a wilderness of seemingly infinite potential, America’s pioneers saw:

an opportunity to regenerate their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church nation; but the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence, and the myth of regeneration through violence became the structuring metaphor of the American experience.”

Historian Peter Boag, writing on this theme about Oregon in particular, notes that the “heroic nature” and nationalism of the turn-of-the-century memoirs “attributed to the pioneer a host of virtues such as vigor, intelligence, courage, morality, and perseverance.” The authors of the Hungry Hill memoirs, from their safe, gilded, progressive, and triumphant perch at the turn of the twentieth century, could afford to mythologize the Battle of Hungry Hill narrative, crafting it in simple terms of supercilious grandeur, moral clarity, and of the triumph of civilization over the wild through heroic violence, with just a touch of wistful nostalgia for the tragedy of the passing of the Noble Savage. By the turn of that century, the survivors of the Takelma, Shasta, and Athabaskan people lived on the remains of the Coast Reservation or in out-of-the-way corners of southern Oregon, where they were now the object of anthropological curiosity rather than a concern of public policy. The actual Battle of Hungry Hill, meanwhile, was lost to the collective memory, just as the location of the battle was lost in the encroaching scrub vegetation and commercial timber plantations of the Grave Creek Hills.

NOTES

1. Personal communication to the author, 1994. George B. Wasson, Jr., and I entered the Ph.D. Program in Anthropology at the University of Oregon together. Wasson inspired me and many other scholars to reconsider the history of the colonial era of Oregon. See Gray H. Whaley, “A Reflection on Genocide in Southwest Oregon in Honor of George Bundy Wasson, Jr.” Oregon Historical Quarterly 105:3 (Fall 2015): 439–440; and Jennifer O’Neil and David G. Lewis, Native American Archives Special Issue: Dedication, Journal of Western Archives 6:1 (2015): 1. The tale of Queen Mary and of the Battle of Hungry Hill was one of the first stories that he told me, and a discussion of our discoveries on the battlefield site was our last personal conversation before his untimely death in 2014. The Queen Mary story always made George smile in the way that only he could smile, and I would like, with gratitude and respect, to dedicate this article to him.
2. The Euro-American forces included Company C, First Regiment of U.S. Dragoons (approximately thirty men), under the command of Capt. Andrew Jackson Smith; Company E, First Regiment of U.S. Dragoons (approximately thirty men) led by Lt. Benjamin Allston; Lt. August V. Kautz and fewer than ten men of the Third Infantry Regiment of the United States Army; and Lt. Horatio G. Gibson and five men of the Third Artillery Regiment of the U.S. Army. Post Returns and Headquarters communications for Fort Orford and Fort Lane, 1855 RG 94 and RG 393, Records of the Department and Division of the Pacific, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. Gibson and the artillerymen and Kautz and the infantrymen joined Capt. Smith and the dragoons by happenstance; Gibson was on the Oregon-California Trail mapping possible railroad routes, and Kautz and his men had recently arrived in the interior valley after scouting a trail from Fort Orford. See also Horatio Gates Gibson, Old John of the Rogue River: Sketch of Services of Graduates in Early Days (West Point: United States Military Academy, 1933), 1–4. August V Kautz, Letter to Joseph Lane, December 1, 1855. Joseph Lane Papers, ms2 1835–1906, microfilm reel 2 Knight Library, University of Oregon, Eugene. Also present were the Ninth Regiment of Oregon Mounted Volunteers, commanded by John E. Ross and including Company A (T.S. Harris commanding about 40 men), Company B (James Bruce commanding about 30 men), Company C (J.S. Rinearson commanding about 40 men), Company D (Robert L. Williams commanding about 30 men), Company F (A.S. Welton commanding about 30 men), and about 150 men of two companies of the Northern Battalion, commanded by Joseph Bailey, and Oregon Mounted Volunteers, commanded by Samuel Gordon. On the numbers, size, and composition of the forces, see letter of Luther C. Hawley, November 14, 1855, published in Oregon Statesman, November 24, 1855; Frances F. Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon (Salem, Ore.: F.C. Baker, State Printer, 1894), 352–53; and Mark Tveskov, Archaeological Investigations at the Battle of Hungry Hill Site, Josephine County, Oregon (Ashland: Southern Oregon University Laboratory of Anthropology Research Report 2015.1, 2015), Appendix B. Meny thanks to Col. (ret’d) David Edgerton, U.S. Army, for compiling this information and providing copies of the Fort Lane post returns to the author. The Native Americans involved in the battle are more difficult to determine. Immediately contemporary accounts are silent as to their identities, and any statement as to who was there will be based on circumstantial evidence. Native American elders interviewed by anthropologists before World War II suggested that in the 1850s, southern Oregon was home to people of Takelma, Shasta, and Athabaskan ethnicities who spoke dialects of Penutian, Hokan, and Athabaskan languages respectively. According to Takelma-speaker Frances Johnson who was at the Battle of Hungry Hill as a young woman, the Hungry Hill battlefield location was known in the Takelma language as Tok waycaw or ‘on top of roots’ and was used on a seasonal basis to gather and dry spruce roots. The participants in the Battle of Hungry Hill possibly included the extended families of Tye George (who signed his name Choiccutah on the Table Rock Treaty of 1853) and Tye Limpy (also spelled Limpe), whose traditional homes were nearby on the main stem of the Rogue River between the mouth of the Applegate River and Grave Creek. Tye Mewaleta, another Takelma speaker whose traditional home was on Cow Creek to the north, could have been present with his extended family as well. John Peabody Harrington, John Peabody Harrington Papers: Alaska/Northwest Coast, reel no. 28, National Anthropological Archives, 1933, also Microcopy of Records of the Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs 1848–1872, reel 608, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C.; George Riddle, Early Days in Oregon (Riddle: Riddle Enterprises, 1931), 34–35; Edward Sapi, “Notes on the Takelma Indians of Southwest Oregon,” American Anthropologist 9:2 (1907): 251–75; Joel V. Berraman, “Tribe Distribution,” Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association 47 (1937); James O. Dorsey, “The Gentile System of the Siletz Reservation, Oregon,” Journal of American Folklore 3:10 (1890): 227–37; Philip Drucker, “The Tolowa and The Southwest Oregon Kin,” University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology 36:4 (1937): 221–99; Edward Sapi, “Notes on the Takelma Indians of Southwestern Oregon,” American Anthropologist 9:3 (1907): 251–75; and Mark Tveskov, “Social Identity and Culture Change on the Southern Northwest Coast,” American Anthropologist 109:3 (2007): 431–41.

3. Anonymous, Letter to Asahel Bush, Oregon Statesman, November 17, 1855. This immediate, relatively clear, concise, and accurate description of the battle includes numbers of participants and casualties that are generally reasonable.


5. Crook, participating in the same railroad survey as Gibson, missed the battle but arrived at Grave Creek on the Oregon-California Trail just as the survivors were trickling back in from the field on November 1, 1855. George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), 26.

6. For comparison, prior to the Civil War only the August 19, 1854, Grattan Massacre in Nebraska, which resulted in the death of twenty-nine U.S. Army soldiers, was a worse defeat for the U.S. Army at the hands of Native Americans. Paul Norman Beck, The First Sioux War: The Grattan Fight and Blue Water Creek, 1854–1856 (Lanham, Mass.: University Press of America, 2004), 40–41. Following the Civil War, the U.S. Army was much larger and more aggressive in pursuing grand military campaigns against Native Americans in the Far West. Major defeats included the Battle of Big Hole, where the Nez Perce inflicted sixty-seven casualties on the U.S. Army while suffering eighty-nine dead, including women and children, and The Battle of Sand Butte, where, in the lava beds on the Oregon-California state line, Modoc warriors under the command of Scarface Charley inflicted over forty casualties on the U.S. Army with minimal loss. Keith A. Murray, The Modocs and Their War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1923), 232–40. The worst defeat suffered by the U.S. Army in the American West was the Battle of Little Bighorn of June 25, 1876, when the U.S. Army suffered more than 250 dead and wounded. Douglas Scott, Richard A. Fox, Jr., Melissa A. Connor, and Dick Harmon, Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 21.


8. Richard Slotkin described the contingent nature of historical memory, local storytelling, the literary character of settler memoirs, and their collective relation to post
homic rationales for American colonialism, in Re-
generation Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860, (Middle-
town: Wesleyan University Press, 1973). Such approaches are so
now in scholarship of the Native American colonial encounter. See Jean O’Brien Firsting and Lasting: Writing
Indians out of Existence in New England, (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); James Joseph Buss, Winning the West with
Words: Language and Conquest in the Lower
Great Lakes (Norman, University of Oklahoma
Press, 2011); and Boyd Cothran, Remembering the
Moric War: Redemptive Violence and the
Making of American Innocence (Chapel Hill:
University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Firsting and Lasting: Writing
Words: Language and Conquest in the Lower
Great Lakes (Norman, University of Oklahoma
Press, 2011); Ari Kelman, Winning the West with
Violence of Graduates in Early Days (West Point:
United States Military Academy, 1913), 1–4.
Kautz, Letter to Joseph Lane.
Tveskov, Archaeological Investiga-
tions, 99–108.
Gillespie’s father was Reverend Jacob
Gillespie, who in 1853 established the Cumber-
land Presbyterian Church in Eugene City,
one of the first Christian churches in Lane
County. The Cumberland Presbyterian, August
11, 1858, p. 169.
Kautz, Letter to Joseph Lane.
One volunteer wrote just after the
battle that the “crack of his [the sniper’s]
rifle could be heard over all the others, and
whenever the smoke was seen to rise from
behind that root, a white man was almost sure
to be killed or wounded.” “The Fight South,”
Oregon Statesman, November 10, 1855. Years
later, Walter Kitchen, a member of Company
E, First Dragoons, recalled that this sniper
was a “half-breed” named “Venus” who “had
himself ensconced in a hollow pine tree.”
“How I came to be in 165 Battles,” Sunday
Call, October 12, 1901.
Gibson later wrote: “The regulars and
a portion of the volunteers held their ground
and fought as well as possible against an
almost ‘sight unseen’ enemy, and hampered
by an enforced resort to Indian methods or
tactics, but a far greater portion of our reduc-
able allies [citizen volunteers] abandoned the
field, and left us alone in our glory of action.”
Gibson, Old John of the Rogue River, 1–4.
Cap. Thomas J. Cram estimated by that afternoon,
250 of the original 300 citizen volunteers had
deserted the battle. Cram, Topographical Memoir
and Report of Captain Thomas T.J. Cram, relative to the Territories of Oregon and
Washington, in the Military Department of the Pacific, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, House
of Representatives Executive Documents, No. 4,
page 310. To this author’s knowledge, the earli-
est written use of the term “Bloody Springs”
comes from John E. Ross, letter to C.S. Drew.
Edward Sheffield, “The Battle of Grave
Creek Hills,” Weekly Oregonian, November
24, 1855.
Luther Hawley, “Letter to Mr. A. Bush,”
Oregon Statesman, November 24, 1855.
Tveskov, Archaeological Investiga-
tions, 48. To this author’s knowledge, the earli-
est written use of the term “chukch!”
comes from John E. Ross, letter to C.S. Drew.
Tveskov, A “Most Disastrous” Affair
Tveskov, A “Most Disastrous” Affair
Requiem for a People
The People are Dancing
ascribes simplicity, purity, and virtue to an
Indigenous person, particularly in contrast
to the perceived corruptions of civilization.
Miot, “The Noble Savage is a longstanding
and common archetype or trope of European
and Euro-American literature and culture that
ascribes simplicity, purity, and virtue to an
Indigenous person, particularly in contrast
to the perceived corruptions of civilization.
For more on the Noble Savage, see Siokin,
Regeneration Through Violence.
“Battle of Hungry Hill,” Weekly Oregonian,
November 1, 1857, p. 2: “the War in
Oregon,” Evening Star, Washington, D.C.,
February 4, 1857.
“Oregon’s Greatest Battle,” Sunday Oregonian,
April 20, 1884.
“Battle of Hungry Hill,” Sunday Oregon-
ian, July 21, 1889.
“Indian Wars of Southern Oregon,”
Medford Mail, August 8, 1902; Rogue River
Reds Fight Five Years Before Yielding,” Or-
“Reminiscences of the Rogue River War,”
Roseburg Plaindealer, September 5, 1904.
“Bill Chance, Veteran Indian Fighter” Sunday Oregonian, July 14, 1907.
35. Guild, “Hungry Hill Fight.”
36. Andrew Jackson Smith was born 1815 in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and graduated from West Point in 1838. After service in the West and in the Civil War, he served as postmaster at St. Louis, Missouri, and died there on January 30, 1897. Meeting of The Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, June 11th 1896 (Saginaw: Seeman & Peters). See also O'Donnell, An Arrow in the Earth, 213.
37. The M 551 Sheridan was designed “as an armoured reconnaissance airborne assault vehicle” and entered service with the U.S. Army in 1966. Over 1,700 were built. The complement of the Army forces at Fort Lane are found in the Post Returns OHQ vol. 118, no. 1 Tveskov, A “Most Disastrous” Affair.
38. The compliment of the Army forces at Fort Lane are found in the Post Returns and Headquarters communications for Fort Oxford and Fort Lane, 1855. RG 94 and RG 393. Records of the Department and Division of the Pacific, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. See also letter of John Woot to Joel Palmer, April 19, 1856, Microcopy of Records of the Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs 1848–1872, reel 14. Letters Received, 1856, No. 160. In the fall of 1855, Judah was closer to the action, but likewise was not in the battle. On October 25, 1855, the day before Smith led his men into Grave Creek Hills, Judah reported that he was at Fort Jones in northern California and was, in fact, unfit for duty due to a sprained ankle (letter to E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General, RG 393 A-45-W41, J25, Records of the Division and Department of the Pacific, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C.). There is no evidence in any primary document of 1855–1856 to suggest that C.S. Drew participated in the Battle of Hungry Hill. Correspondence of the Ninth Regiment of Oregon Mounted Volunteers, for which Drew served as adjutant, finds him at Camp Stewart near present day Central Point on October 25, 1855, (letter of October 25, from John E. Ross, “per C.S. Drew” to J.S. Rinearson, Benjamin Franklin Dowell Paper, and in Jacksonville on October 28, 1855, (letter of John Miller to George L. Curry, Governor of Oregon, Oregon State Archives, Folder 1/34, Adjutant General’s Correspondence, 1855, 89A-12, Oregon Military Department). On October 29, one day before Smith, Ross, Kautz, and the others met at Grave Creek to plan what was to become the Battle of Hungry Hill, John Ross wrote a letter from Evan’s Ferry (on the Oregon-California Trail near the present day town of Rogue River), to C.S. Drew, who was then in Jacksonville some thirty miles away. Ross reported that he was on his way with his volunteer companies to meet Captain Smith at Grave Creek, further indicating that Drew was, in fact, not part of the Ninth Regiment of Oregon Mounted Volunteers who were on their way to fight the Battle of Hungry Hill. November 7, 1855, finds Drew again at Camp Stewart in his role as adjutant, writing letters on behalf of Ross, who by then was on his way back to the Rogue River valley from Grave Creek (“Regimental Order,” printed in the Oregon Statesman, November 24, 1855). Impressionistically, directly inverse to his comrade Ross, Drew’s forte was the pen rather than the sword.
40. Holland Bailey, the brother of volunteer officer Joseph Bailey, was killed on the Oregon-California Trail on October 23 or 24, 1855, while leading a cattle drive north to the Willamette Valley from California. Edward Sheffield, “The Battle of Hungry Hill,” Oregonian, November 24, 1855.
42. Both O’Donnell, in An Arrow in the Earth, and Schwartz, in The Rogue River Indian War, describe the “Know Nothings” and the other constituents of this contentious political landscape in fine detail.
44. It is commonly assumed that Tyee John, a leader of an extended family of Shasta ethnicity who originally resided in a community on Deer Creek in the Illinois River valley, was at the Battle of Hungry Hill. The first specific mention of Tyee John in the Battle of Hungry Hill is an anonymously penned article appearing in the Oregonian on the one-year anniversary of the battle on November 1, 1856, well after John had become famous by almost defeating Smith at the Battle of Big Bend in May 1856. After hearing the news of the Lupton Massacre, Tyee John led his people off the Table Rock Reservation to meet Tyee George, Tyee Limpy, and their people, who at that time were encamped on Louse Creek on the Oregon-California Trail. By October 10, the Native American leaders split up, with Tyee John returning to Deer Creek, and Tyee George and Tyee Limpy travelling into the Grave Creek Hills. From these relatively fortified localities, these men led guerilla raids against homesteads and travelers. George and Limpy were likely responsible for attacks on the gold mines at Galice on October 17 and on homesteads along Cow Creek on October 23 and 24, while John led attacks on a pack train on the Crescent City trail on October 25 and on the gold mines at Althouse Creek shortly thereafter. The last recorded act near Deer Creek occurred when thirty tons of hay were burned on a nearby ranch on November 5, four days after the Battle of Hungry Hill. It was only after the Battle of Hungry Hill that Tyee John, Tyee Limpy, Tyee George, and others joined forces, and this occurred deeper in the even more remote canyon of the middle portion of the Rogue River. See Francis Fuller Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon (Salem: Frank C. Baker, 1894), 401; Donald W. Sheffield, Dancing Again, 85, 88; Schwartz, The Rogue River Indian War, 59; Roland B. Dixon, “The Shasta,” Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History 17:5 (1910): 381–498, 1907; H. Robert Winton, Survival and Adaptation Among the Shasta Indians (Ashland: Winton Associates, 1986); Mary Capelan and Betty Hall, The Shasta History (Yreka: The Shasta Nation, 2000); Testimony of Col. J.E. Ross in Relation to the Commencement and Termination of the Rogue River War, of 1853, taken January 3, 1853, in Jacksonville, Oregon, Microcopy of Records of the Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs 1848–1872, reel 5; E. Steele, letter to C.S. Drew, November 13, 1857, Cayuse, Yakima and Rogue River Wars Papers, University of Oregon Special Collections box 1, folder 47, Testimony of R. Dugan in Relation to the Commencement and Termination of the Rogue River War of 1853, taken January 10, 1855, in Jacksonville, Oregon, Microcopy of Records of the Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs 1848–1872, reel 5; George Ambrose, Letter of October 11, 1855, to Joel Palmer, 34th Cong., 1st Session., H.Ex.Doc. 93, Serial 18:67-68, 1856; Andrew Jackson Smith, Letter of October 14, 1855, to Maj. E.D. Townsend, RG 393 Records of the Division and Department of the Pacific, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C.; Charles S. Drew, An Account of the Origin and Early Prosecution Letter of the Indian War in Oregon, 36th Cong., 1st Session, Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 59, L.F. Mason to Joseph Lane, 25 December 1855, Joseph Lane Letters 1835–1906; John Ross to Andrew Jackson Smith, October 17, 1855, Benjamin Franklin Dowell Papers; W.B. Lewis to John Ross, October 18, 1855, Benjamin Franklin Dowell Papers; Cyrenius Mulkey, Reminiscences, MS. 981, Oregon Historical Society; George H. Ambrose, letter of October 28, 1855, to Joel Palmer, 34th Cong., 1st Session., H.Ex.Doc. 93, Serial OHQ vol. 118, no. 1
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